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The Theory of Economic Policy and the
Law of Torts
Roberi L. Birmingham*
I. THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY
A. INTODUCTioN
On October 27, 1969, the first prize in economics to the
memory of Alfred Nobel, recently funded by the Sveriges Riks-
bank of Sweden, was awarded jointly to Ragnar Frisch of Oslo
University and Jan Tinbergen of the Netherlands School of
Economics. The Royal Academy of Sciences of Sweden, which
selected the recipients from among about thirty nominees, com-
mended them "for having developed and applied dynamic models
for the analysis of economic processes."' Tinbergen's contribu-
tions include the discovery and elaboration of a framework for
decision making known as the theory of economic policy, which
may be used in the study of legal problems. In this article I
examine the policies and objectives of the law of tort damages
from the perspective which this theory supplies.
B. ExPLIcATioN
To Tinbergen the success of a solution to a problem of eco-
nomic policy can be expressed as a function of target variables.
Target variables are variables which cannot be manipulated di-
rectly but which are determined by interaction among instru-
ment variables and data. The values which target variables or
instrument variables can assume may be restricted, for example
by conditions of nonnegativity. Subject to such constraints,
values of instrument variables may be specified arbitrarily by
the decision maker. Data are factors having an impact on per-
formance but subject to neither direct nor indirect control. Ir-
relevant variables are side effects of policy decisions not taken
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
The author wishes to thank Professor Peter Hay of the University of
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1. Lee, 2 Europeans Win First Nobel Economics Prize, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 28, 1969, at 1, col. 1. See Heinemann, Econometrics: Taking the
Guess out of Prediction, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1969, at 16, col 1; Economet-
rics: Equations not for Everyday Use, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1969, § 4
(Week in Review), at 10, col. 1; Prize-Winning Pioneers in an Esoteric
Science, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1969, at 16, col. 1.
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into account by evaluative criteria; they usually may be elimi-
nated from express consideration by reformulation of the model
under scrutiny. Ideally the decision maker selects those values
of the instrument variables which maximize community wel-
fare.2
C. INTERPRETATION
This analysis permits division of problems of policy into
those involving fixed targets and those involving flexible targets.
If in a given problem the number of instrument variables equals
or exceeds the number of target variables, the decision maker
will normally be able to choose levels of instrument variables so
as to achieve individually optimal target values. If the number
of target variables exceeds the number of instrument variables,
on the other hand, compromise among competing target claims
will typically be necessary. In the former case one instrument
can usually be applied to control each target variable without
regard to its other effects; in the latter, at least one instrument
must serve to regulate two or more target variables.-' This
distinction is of fundamental importance. Analysts have re-
marked that a "basic tenet of the theory of economic policy de-
veloped in the postwar period is that, in general, a necessary re-
quirement for the attainment of a number of policy goals is the
availability of at least an equal number of independent policy
weapons."
'4
The difference, essentially that between a solution which
satisfies all interests completely and one in which inconsistent
interests must be balanced, is crucial to some aspects of the law.
In particular, a number of seeming anomalies can be explained
as products of an unwillingness of decision makers to develop
separate instruments to implement separate policies when such
policies only infrequently dictate disparate results. Naturally
this propensity has not gone unremarked. Bevan, for example,
notes that in the criminal law "the attempt to make one single
thing, or one single course of action, serve three, or two, wholly
different purposes, commonly leads to its being unsatisfactory in
its results . . .-
2. J. TINBERGEN, ECONOMIC POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND DESIGN
(1967); J. TINBERGEN, ON THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY (1952).
3. K. Fox, J. SENGUPTA & E. THORBECKE, THE THEORY OF QUANTI-
TATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY WITH APPLICATIONS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
STABILIZATION 20-50 (1966).
4. Willett & Forte, Interest Rate Policy and External Balance, 83Q.J. ECON. 242 (1969).
5. E. BEVAN, SYMBOLISM AND BELIEF 221 (1938).
[Vol. 55:1
ECONOMIC POLICY AND TORTS
II. THE LAW OF TORTS
A. IHISTORY
Early antecedents of modern tort doctrine appear primarily
to have been products of efforts to maintain order by restricting
individual reactions to supposed wrongs:
In the beginnings of law the idea is simply to keep the peace.
In primitive law justice, in the sense of the end of the legal sys-
tem, was a device to keep the peace. Whatever served to avert
private vengeance and prevent private war was an instrument ofjustice. The law existed as a body of rules by which contro-
versies were adjusted peaceably. At first, therefore, it at-
tempted nothing more affirmatively than to furnish the injured
person a substitute for revenge. Where modem law thinks of
compensation for an injury, archaic law thought of composition
for the desire to be avenged .... [T]he original problem of
the law was to narrow the field of self help, to regulate self re-
dress and finally to supersede it by peaceful modes of re-
dress .... The measure of what the person wronged may exact
is not the extent of the injury done but the extent of the desire
for vengeance awakened.0
The less ambitious regulatory measures might at first have
sought only to control procedural aspects of private war; thus
in 1187 the Diet of the German Empire at Niirnberg decreed
"that he who intends to do damage to another or to injure him
shall give notice to him at least three days before by a sure
messenger.' 7 The growth of collective authority was accompa-
nied by limitation of the form and extent of retaliatory response.
In some cases permitted vengeance, although appropriate given
the primitive test of equivalence with the initial harm, did not
encourage additional injury: " [W] here a man falls from a tree
and kills another below, he shall be held innocent; yet the
blood-feud will be allowed if insisted upon, but it may be carried
out in one way only,-the avenger may himself mount the tree,
and in turn fall upon the slayer." Eventually the vestigial claim
to redress by reciprocating violence was reduced to a right to
monetary payment.9 The problem of the magnitude of this pay-
ment remained.
6. Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and
Doctrines, .27 HARv. L. REV. 195, 198-99, 200, 202 (1914). See H. Pomrs,
Axw HIsToRIcAL INTRODUcTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSmTa ONS 20,
306, 307 (2d ed. 1943).
7. Pound, supra note 6, at 200 n.22.
8. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HAuv.
L. REv. 315, 324 n.4 (1894).
9. Harding, Individual Responsibility in Anglo-American Law, in
RESPONSSIILITY 3x LAw AND iN MoRALs 41, 44-46 (A. Harding ed. 1960).
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B. TARGETS: DEFINITION
Section 901 of the Restatement of Torts provides:
The rules for determining the measure of damages in tort are
based upon the purposes for which actions of tort are main-
tainable. These purposes are:
(a) to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms;
(b) to settle disputes as to rights;
(c) to punish wrongdoers. 10
The second purpose recognizes the initial justification of gov-
ernment-sponsored relief but offers no guidance with respect to
measures of recovery other than to dictate award of nominal
damages in instances where other tests might indicate dismissal.
The first purpose is recapitulated in the assertion that "the law
of torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position
as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the
tort";1 the third engrafts to this standard additional criteria
of deterrence and retribution. The formulation is not novel; in
1763 Lord Chief Justice Pratt noted that "[d] amages are designed
not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as
a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding
for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to
the action itself."1
2
For the moment I disregard transaction costs, those frictional
costs incurred in shifts from one position of equilibrium to
another. In terms of the Tinbergen model one may define three
target variables:
Yl = the amount which if paid to plaintiff would be just suf-
ficient to compensate him for his injury;
Y2 = the amount which if paid by defendant would be just
sufficient to deter undesired conduct;
= the amount which if paid by defendant would be just
sufficient to satisfy legitimate societal and individual de-
sires for vengeance.
The damage remedy, however, confines the decision maker to use
of a single instrument variable:
z = the payment by the defendant to the plaintiff.
Achievement of the retributive goal requires exaction from
the defendant of a sum equal to or greater than Y3. Retributive
and deterrent criteria are not, however, independent. That de-
gree of social undesirability of conduct sufficient to legitimate
a given retributory payment would presumably also compel an
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 901 (1939).
11. Id. § 901, comment a, at 537.
12. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.P. 1763).
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equal or greater payment on deterrent grounds. If y3 is thought
to equal y2, attention may be focused on the potential incon-
sistency of y, and y2 alone. Ideally the instrument variable
should be set to attain exactly the desired target variable levels:
Z = Yi
Z =y2
If z exceeds y, the plaintiff will be awarded more than is
necessary to compensate him for his injuries; if z is less than
y, the plaintiff will not be fully compensated. Similarly, if z
exceeds Y2 the defendant will be required to pay more than is
necessary optimally to deter him; if z is less than y2 the de-
fendant will be suboptimally deterred. Simultaneous satisfac-
tion of these relationships requires that y, equal y2.
C. TARGETs: CoNsIsTENcY
Payments exacted from individuals causing injury should
make relevant socially undesirable conduct unprofitable to them
but not eliminate their gain from socially desirable conduct. So-
cially undesirable conduct can be differentiated from socially de-
sirable conduct by a rule sufficiently value-free to command
wide acceptance. One can isolate, at least conceptually, a set of
states of society from which movement benefiting any one in-
dividual may be made only at the cost of injury to another.
Such states may be characterized as Pareto optimal or efficient.
Although choice among Pareto optimal states entails evaluation
of competing individual claims, the superiority of at least one
such state over any designated state outside the set of Pareto
optimal states may be defended as almost tautological. Affirm-
ance of such superiority follows directly from acceptance of the
proposition that scarce means should be allocated so as to maxi-
mize the satisfaction of ends; if this is an ethical premise, it is at
least one which generally enjoys unqualified assent.1 3
In the prototypical case, where the actions of the defendant
harm the plaintiff but have no impact on third parties, Pareto
optimality can be achieved only by equating the sum exacted to
deter unwanted conduct with the amount which must be paid
to the injured individual to assure that his utility level is not
affected by his injury. Where the tort is intentional and the
defendant can accurately compute the advantages and disad-
13. R. Emmi, EcoNocIc ANALYsIs AND ScIENTIFc PHLosoPHY 39
(1967).
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vantages of alternative courses of conduct, this result is obvious.
Greater liability would discourage intentional infliction of some
injuries which could be offset by compensation without exhaust-
ing the gain to the tortfeasor; a smaller exaction would permit
individual profit from practices which on balance decrease com-
munity welfare. Imposition of a duty to compensate on those
who have caused unintended harm will similarly promote alloca-
tive efficiency through consequent changes in the frequency of
activities occasioning liability. As has been suggested, "[t]he
best way we can establish the extent to which we want to allow
such activities is by a market decision based on the relative price
of each of these activities and of their substitutes when each
bears the costs of the accidents it causes. 1 4  The additional ex-
pense of behavior which increases the likelihood of unintended
tortious conduct will reduce its attractiveness and therefore nor-
mally its prevalence. Increased entrepreneurial liability will
for example be reflected in higher prices charged for an ultimate
product or service; the affected firm or industry will reduce out-
put if demand is not completely inelastic and the profit motive
prevails. That little or no change in behavior may occur in
some instances does not signal insufficient deterrent pressure
but merely demonstrates that uncontrolled patterns of conduct
need not differ greatly from optimal patterns.15
14. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Non-
fault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. RaV. 713, 719 (1965).
15. The impact of imposition of a duty to compensate can be pre-
sented in the familiar terms of microeconomic theory. Measure the cost
of particular conduct and its frequency along vertical and horizontal
axes respectively and indicate as by line aa in the diagram below the
frequencies associated with various levels of cost. If compensatory
requirements increase the cost of the conduct involved from c, to c2,
the frequency of that conduct will change from fl to f 2. The change offrequency is determined both by the magnitude of the change in cost
and the inclination of line aa. While f2 will usually be less than f1,
ia
SI a
:12 :11
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Ideally y, therefore will equal y2 and the requirements
which each imposes can be met by manipulation of the single
instrument variable z. Implicit legitimation of injury when re-
sulting losses are outweighed by associated gains is not unprece-
dented. Although mr. Justice Black can find it "difficult at
best" to admit that financial losses can be balanced against in-
dividual injury or death,16 the callously realistic disagree. One
critic of ritualistic alarm concerning highway safety contends
"that there is, in effect, a desirable level of automobile accidents-
desirable, that is, from a broad point of view; in the sense that
it is a necessary concomitant of things of greater value to so-
ciety. ' 17 One should not forget that the duty to compensate
is not the sole deterrent of tortious conduct. Thus a sign near
an Irish power station admonishes: "To touch these overhead
cables means instant death. Offenders will be prosecuted."1 8
D. TARGrETs: INcoNsisTENCY
That the measure of damages derived above is not undeviat-
ingly applied is clear from instances where courts either assert
an unwillingness to or do not in fact compensate an injured per-
son exactly. Williams states: "Where possible the law seems
to like to ride two or three horses at once; but occasionally a situ-
ation occurs where one must be selected. The tendency is to
choose the deterrent purpose for torts of intention, and the
compensatory purpose for other torts."' 9 The problem, however,
is much more complex. Divergence of the amount recovered
from the sum which would exactly compensate the plaintiff ap-
pears due to error in computing or inability to compute the
monetary equivalent of an injury, belief that this monetary
behavior will be unaffected by added cost if line aa is vertical. In any
case within the narrow framework of my analysis, if compensation is
exact, the induced frequency is optimal.
Salmond states that "[n]o one can be deterred by a threat of pun-
ishment from doing harm which he did not intend and which he did
his best to avoid." J. SALmOND, LAw OF ToRTs: A TREATISE ON THE
ENGLISH LAW or LIABILTy FOR CIVIL INJUIEs 18 (10th ed. W. Stally-
brass 1945). His pronouncement is premised on a semantic distinction
without functional significance.
16. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, Rock Is. &
Pac. R ., 393 U.S. 129, 140 (1968).
17. Williams, The Nonsense About Safe Driving, FORTUNA Sept.
1958, at 118, quoted in L. LEwIN, REPORT FROZA IRON MOUNTAIN ON THE
Possimrrr AND DESIRABIL OF PEACE 46 (1967).
18. Quoted in N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1969, at 59, coL 2.
19. Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CuRm LEGAL
PROB. 137, 172 (1951).
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equivalent is not always an accurate measure of deterrent re-
quirements and introduction of distributive criteria to supple-
ment the allocative standard. Isolation of the importance of
each of these factors in motivating an individual decision or in
explaining a rule of law is frequently impossible. Historical
accident and unthinking adherence to precedent are often dis-
positive.
1. Monetary Equivalence.-Unless counterbalanced by jury
bias, failure to allow recovery by the plaintiff of his costs of
litigation will in itself cause distortion. In general, compen-
sation does not seem to reach the point where the plaintiff is in-
different between recompensed injury and freedom from harm.
Where death has occured, however, damage measures have been
and remain particularly inadequate.
Absence of common law civil liability for wrongful death
was long a source of paradox. Prosser and Smith relate:
[I]t was more profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff
than to scratch him-a fact which gave rise to the quite un-
founded legend that this was the reason that Pullman passen-
gers in berths rode with their heads to the front, and that the
fire axes in the cars were provided for trainmen to use in
finishing off those injured in train wrecks.20
While some relief is now available, generally as a result of legis-
lative intervention, few would contend that the measure of re-
covery either by the estate of the deceased or by his family is
fully compensatory. Even in a capitalist society, potential earn-
ings hardly summarize the value of life. Determination of the
sum required when the individual is no longer alive to choose
between compensation and freedom from harm is particularly
difficult. In addition, a frequently pervasive disinterest in the
welfare of others, who must of course receive the equilibrating
payments, will often make full compensation impossible.2 1
20. W. PROSSER & Y. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ToRTs 602
(4th ed. 1967).
21. That exact compensation in terms of the creation of indiffer-
ence between life and death is possible is indicated by the Indian ex-
perience of Sir Richard Burton:
He seems to have been the first to point out to Sir Charles-who
was most reluctant to believe it-that though he had signed the
death warrants of several rich convicted murderers, the actual
man hanged was usually a poverty-stricken substitute hired in
his stead. Burton interviewed one pauper "badal" who had
agreed to be executed for a murder he had not committed and
asked him why. "Sain!" came the answer. "I have been a
pauper all my life. My belly is empty. My wife and children
are half starved. This is fate, but it is beyond my patience. I
get two hundred and fifty rupees. With fifty I will buy rich
[Vol. 55:1
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2. External Effects.-The rule equating optimal deterrence
with exact compensation was derived through consideration of a
case in which the actions of the defendant injure the plaintiff
but have no impact on third parties. In a number of situations,
seeming divergence from the requirements of Pareto optimality is
attributable to attempts to take account of otherwise uncom-
pensated costs imposed or benefits conferred on nonlitigants.
If such external economies or diseconomies arise from the con-
duct of the defendant, the deterrent exaction needed to achieve
ideal equilibrium will normally exceed or fall below the mone-
tary equivalent of the loss suffered by the plaintiff. The result-
ing dilemma is exemplified by two attempts to internalize ex-
ternalities, the collateral source rule and early judicial reluctance
to burden industrial enterprise with liability for injuries it
caused.
The collateral source rule states that payments received
from others by an injured individual shall be disregarded when
computing the amount he may recover from the person who has
injured him. The sums in question are substantial. One sum-
mary of compensation to victims of automobile accidents found
that only fifty-five percent of the total received was attributable
to tort liability settlements; thirty-eight percent came from auto-
mobile, medical or life insurance, while social security provided
the remaining seven percent.2 2  In at least one case, collateral
benefits alone amounted to more per week than the average
earnings of the plaintiff before his injury.2 3  The decision to
deter in spite of consequent overcompensation is not unsup-
ported: "If there must be a windfall certainly it is more just
that the injured person shall profit therefrom, rather than the
wrongdoer shall be relieved of his full responsibility for his
wrongdoing."24 Others disagree: "[A] general rule confining
damages to a compensatory level seems infinitely preferable to
its opposite.... Surely American jurisdictions should now
cease to compensate plaintiffs for earnings never lost and ex-
penses never in fact incurred ....
food and fill myself before going out of the world. The rest I
will leave to my family. What better can I do, Sain?"
F. BRODIE, THE DEVIL DRIvEs: A LiFE oF Sm RICHARD BuRToN 63-64 (1967).
22. A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTz & R. BOmnAUGH,
AUTOMOBILE AcciDENT CosTs AND PAYmENTs 147, Tables 4-9 (1964).
23. Foxley v. Olton, [1965] 2 Q.B. 306.
24. Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958).
25. Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source
Rule, 77 HARv. L. REV. 741, 753 (1964).
19701
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Because his mortality dictates that he discount future in-
come more highly than would be ideal from the standpoint of
the community, and because he attaches a negative value to risks
which in the aggregate yield statistically determinate outcomes,
the typical individual entrepreneur probably selects a rate of in-
vestment below that which would be socially optimal. Need to
promote economic development during the early phases of in-
dustrialization may have motivated both reliance on fault rather
than causation as the usual basis of liability and frequent pre-
clusion of recovery through liberal application of the fellow-
servant rule. Entrepreneurial necessity may also have moti-
vated the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. Unwillingness to "impose a penalty upon efforts, made
in a reasonable, skilful, and careful manner, to rise above a con-
dition of barbarism" 2 6 appears to have been widespread:
[MIany of our judges believed that the development of this
young country under a system of private enterprise would be
hindered and delayed as long as the element of chance exposed
enterprisers to liability for the consequences of pure accident,
without fault of some sort .... Judicial subsidies ... to youth-
ful enterprise removed pressure from the pocket-books of in-
vestors and gave incipient industry a chance to experiment on
low-cost operations without the risk of losing its reserve in
actions by injured employees. Such a policy no doubt seems
ruthless; but in a small way it probably helped to establish
industry, which in turn was essential to the good society .... 27
3. Distributive Criteria.-All societies temper principles of
allocative efficiency with distributive considerations; few would
accept a system offering affluence to a minority but bare subsist-
ence to most persons simply because it is purportedly efficient.
The persuasiveness of the Paretian standard derives from its
independence of interpersonal welfare comparisons. This stand-
ard necessarily provides no basis for choice between imputations
which give all utility to a single individual and other more
balanced imputations. Although Pareto optimality is not con-
ceptually inconsistent with any distributive pattern, certain
areas of behavior have traditionally been subject to nonmarket
controls. Pervasive use of market criteria would arguably com-
pel reduction of criminal law to tort law; present offenses would
be encouraged so long as the perpetrator could compensate the
victim for the harm suffered and still profit from his act. This
result, however, is precluded by the belief that certain rights
or protections should not be rationed on the basis of income.
26. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 448 (1873).
27. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA.
L. REv. 359, 365, 368 (1951).
[Vol. 55:1
ECONOMIC POLICY AND TORTS
Intrusion of distributive criteria is also evident in the law
of torts. Although an allocative standard would require that
the defendant bear the transaction costs of litigation unless such
costs are attributable to noncooperation by the plaintiff, the
state has assumed a portion of this burden. Punitive damages
may be in part disguised compensation or adjustments for ex-
ternalities. To some extent, however, they appear to implement
distributive goals. Absence of nonfault liability seems to a de-
gree similarly motivated, since the likelihood of an individual
causing accidental injury is a function of, among other variables,
the capital under his control. A more recent bias in favor of per-
sons seeking recovery is partially explained by the likelihood
that those from whom recovery is sought will be more wealthy.
E. INsTRUmmNTs
So long as compensation is possible, the optimal deterrent
should seldom diverge from the compensatory ideal. External
economies and diseconomies need not be internalized indirectly
through adjustment of the damage measure. Where the conduct
of the defendant harms others besides the plaintiff, facilitation
of recovery by these additional victims would seem appropriate.
Gains to third parties should be balanced by payments from those
benefited to the defendant rather than by undercompensation
of the plaintiff. The law of torts is not a proper redistributive
vehicle.
Sometimes, however, the diffuseness of the injuries or bene-
fits attributable to the conduct of the defendant precludes or
makes impracticable recovery by or assessment of all affected in-
dividuals. Although criminal sanctions or direct subsidies can
optimalize incentive in such cases, application of these instru-
ments usually requires legislation or administrative initiative.
The burden of adjustment must therefore often be borne by the
law of torts. Where such externalities are present, the sum
which should be exacted from the defendant to deter unwanted
conduct will not be equal to the amount which must be paid to
the plaintiff to assure that his utility level is not affected by his
injury.
Since Yi will not equal y2 , compensatory and deterrent ob-
jectives cannot be simultaneously satisfied through use of a
single instrument variable. The choice confronting the court re-
duces to determination of the value of the parameter a in the
equation:
19701
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z=ay,+ (1-a)y2  0!5a<1
If a is set equal to unity, the plaintiff is precisely compensated
but the defendant inaccurately deterred; if a is set equal to zero,
compensation is inexact but deterrence appropriate. Intermedi-
ate values of a give varying weights to each factor. In all cases
the result is unsatisfactory.
The remedy is obvious. The single instrument variable
should be bifurcated so that the number of instrument variables
equals the number of target variables. Here z, payment by the
defendant to the plaintiff, can be replaced by:
z, = payment by the state to the plaintiff;
Z2 = payment by the defendant to the state.
We may thus write:
Zl = yi
Z2 = Y2
With this adjustment, choice between competing purposes is
no longer required.
III. CONCLUSION: LAW AND EQUITY
Anomalies in the law of torts have been explained as deriv-
ing in part from judicial unwillingness or inability to proliferate
instrument variables to accommodate occasional discrepancies
generated by otherwise compatible purposes. The theory of eco-
nomic policy is equally applicable in other areas of the law. For
example, it is relevant to analysis of differences between actions
at law and proceedings in equity. The judicial decision ideally
serves both to do justice between individual litigants and to es-
tablish or confirm a rule applicable in resolving other dis-
putes. In equity, the chancellor, limited by professional integrity
to a single instrument, his ruling, frequently could not achieve
these two goals; the rigidity of much equity doctrine and explicit
retention of judicial discretion evidence the necessary compro-
mise. At law introduction of the jury made available a second
instrument allowing simultaneous satisfaction of both objectives.
Exercise of the power to do justice inherent in the duty of the
jury to find facts can mitigate the otherwise harsh consequences
of undeviating adherence by judges to rules of law: "The jury,
always in criminal cases, and within broad limits in civil cases,
is allowed to thwart the law's commands-in effect to find the
facts untruthfully-if it is not satisfied with the justness of the
[Vol. 55:1
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commands as applied to the case in hand."28  The resulting
duality is best demonstrated by Rex v. Macallister, decided in
1808, in which a jury avoided imposition of the death penalty
by determining that a stolen ten-pound note was worth thirty-
nine shillings.2 9 Here as in the law of torts restatement of com-
mon problems in terms of instrument and target variables of-
fers insight into the determinants of judicial behavior.
28. Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in
EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 48, 58 (D. Lerner ed. 1959).
29. G. GOTIEB, THE LoGIc OF CHoIcE: AN INVESnGATION OF THE
CONCEPTS OF RULE Am RATroNAry 44 (1968).
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